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RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY 
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
REPLIES TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
1 . CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
(a) Liability has become a primary rule of customary international law obligating a 
recalcitrant State to pay compensation or make amends for the resulting damage for 
which the State is accountable. 
Once this primary rule is breached, regardless of the origin of the rule whether 
it is derived from a Treaty or is based on a norm of customary international law, the 
liable State is responsible for secondary obligations under international law. Thus, a 
State which is held liable as Canada was in the Trail Smelter Arbitration, is further 
responsible to ensure the non-repetition or non-recurrence of the same or like 
environmental damage to the United States by taking all measures necessary to 
prevent the recurrence of such damage. 
In a manner of speaking the function of liability may be said to be of a dual 
character, but to be more precise the primary rule of liability, as derived from the 
maxim : "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas ", entails a secondary obligation to 
restore or restitution and to make reparation. These are measures ex nunc and ~ 
tunc under the law of State responsibility which is engaged as soon as a primary rule 
of international obligation is breached. The final consequences of secondary rules of 
State responsibility may also encompass the adoption of measures ex ante or 
preventive measures, now perfectly consistent with the precautionary principles 
advocated for all conducts of States in environmental law. 
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(b) The concept of punitive damages is not favored under international law·, 
although preventive measures could be regarded as a form of sanction, but the 
purpose is to prevent harm and not to punish the polluter. This does not preclude the 
polluting State from viewing the obligation to take measures ex ante or precautionary 
measures as a penalty for past misconduct, wilful or unintentional. 
It is important to distinguish punitive sanctions from preventive measures, and 
consequently also punitive damages from mandatory precautionary measures. Thus, 
provisional measures indicated by the International Court of Justice to maintain the 
status quo ante of both parties or to prevent further deterioration of the existing 
situation are not punitive sanctions imposed by the Court. They are not designed to 
punish either party, but merely to preserve the rights and obligations of all concerned. 
Furthermore, it should likewise be observed that as State practice begins to 
favor the concept of offenses against humanity as including offenses against the 
environment, equating environmental crime or international damage to the 
environment as a serious international crime or a grave crime against the law of 
nations, there is no reason why punitive damages should not be assessed. 
However, the purpose of punishing a criminal is not the same as awarding 
excessive and exorbitant compensation to the victim of environmental damage as a 
punishment as may be done in some domestic legal systems. For instance, punitive 
damages in cases, such as the Bhopal Incident, could be awarded by a jury if the trial 
took place in the United States, and if the victims were American, and the negligent 
corporation foreign, which could be as high as US$ 45 million per head, whereas in 
reality the damages paid by the wrong-doing corporation in that case were no where 
near compensatory, let alone exemplary. In other words, punitive sanctions in 
international law or punitive damages for that matter would be intended to punish or 
penalize the offender or wrong-doer, and would take the form of FINES collected by 
the international community or as a contribution to the common fund to pay 
compensation to unpaid victims and never to overpay the privileged few who happen 
to incur environmental damage or suffering. Thus, in Exxon Valdez Case, the fines 
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collected were not only to punish the negligent misconduct but to contribute to the 
expenses of cleaning up the oil pollution caused by negligent navigation. Fines and 
punitive damages are not for the individual victims or sufferers of the injurious 
consequences of an activity under the control or within the jurisdiction of the State, 
hence its liability for compensation and answerability for future recurrences of the 
harmful effects. Fines are not advanced payment for future damage or suffering but 
should contribute to preventive or pre-emptive measures. 
(c) The new links of international environmental law with intergenerational equity, 
sustainable development, environmental security and human rights are clearly 
indicative of the current perspectives on the question of responsibility and liability. 
The links are logical and inevitable. They have always existed although unnoticed 
until recently. More linkages will emerge as new perspectives on the fundamental 
question of responsibility and liability which must at all times remain evolutionary, as 
long as law continues to evolve for the international community as well as within a 
member nation of the global society. 
2. LEGAL DISTINCTIONS 
(a) The distinction between State responsibility and liability or international liability 
or accountability of a State is very useful. It is conducive to a broader scope of 
measures destined to prevent harm or its recurrence and measures of restitution, 
restoration or reparation. Thus, liability is a primarily rule, a breach of this rule by a 
State will engage its responsibility. The consequences of State responsibility may 
entail the adoption or award of measures ex nunc, ex tunc and ex ante. But there 
is no breach of the primary rule if the offender, or in the case under examination the 
offending State, has undertaken to pay, or better still, has proceeded to make 
reparation or to pay the compensation which satisfies the requirement of 
international law and/or of the domestic law of the State or States concerned. Thus, 
4 
liability could be pre-empted or aborted by the decision of the State to pay 
compensation. 
Attention is drawn to the legislation in force in some countries, such as the 
United States, where certain industries are allowed to generate some pollution up to 
the extent to which they have been permitted to emit. Thus, a pre-paid compensation 
is tantamount to a license to commit environmental harm without entailing the liability 
to make any further reparation or to pay any more compensation other than the 
licensing fees already paid in full. 
Further consideration needs to be given to the broader scope of measures as 
to prevention rather than allowance of pre-paid licenses to injure one's neighbor, even 
within the national boundary. Transnational or transboundary injury could not be pre-
condoned unilaterally by the system of licensing operative in one or more States, 
merely to ensure sufficient fund to pay for the compensation. The establishment of 
such a common fund is not unusual for accidents resulting from incidents of 
navigation at sea or on the high-seas, which could occur in spite of all the 
precautionary measures taken, even ex abundante cautelae. 
(b) If the primary rule could be stated in terms of an obligation not to harm others, 
then in the context of international environmental law the very inducement of harm 
or damage or harmful effect triggers the duty to compensate or to make reparation. 
At this stage, environmental law does not yet admit "iniuria sine damno". There must 
be clear and convincing evidence of physical damage to the environment or to a 
person or property on which a right of action can be based. There is no right of 
action, hence no liability, without actual damage, i.e., personal injury or harmful 
effects. Thus, assessment is essential, and impact assessment must now be made 
for every industrial project. Such assessment is made to ensure the taking of 
effective measures to prevent harm, especially in regard to ultra-hazardous activities 
or substance. The law tends to presume the engagement of liability whenever injury 
ensues or harmful consequences occur. Res ipsa loquitur is appropriate to allocate the 
risk which should be placed squarely on the producer or transporter of ultra-hazardous 
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materials or substance. 
(c) Liability or international liability of States is a shortened version of international 
liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international 
law. It happens that most instances of international environmental damage entail 
international liability of a State under international as well as national laws. On the 
international law side, the breach of a primary obligation not to harm others engages 
the State responsibility of the country whence emanate the harmful effects. The 
engagement of State responsibility triggers legal consequences prescribed by the 
series of secondary rules, in terms of rights and obligations as between the injured 
State and the offending State, and possibly also third parties. In national jurisdictions, 
local remedies may be available to redress the harmful effects, by way of reparation, 
compensation, cessation of harmful activities or preventive measures to avoid future 
harms, or to reduce and abate the harms already caused. 
Liability regimes may be in place within a national legal system or systems. 
They may have been created as the result of a decision reached at a sub-regional or 
regional level, such as the Malacca Straits Council, or the ASEAN Convention or an 
international agreement on a global scale, such as compensation fund for oil pollution, 
or for a special geographical area such as the United Nations Claims Commission in 
Geneva in respect of compensation for environmental damage in Kuwait. Liability 
regimes can also create secondary rules, supplementary to or supplanting the more 
general secondary rules under the law of State responsibility. For instance, injury to 
aliens may fall under a special regime with regard to economic injury or loss of 
investment which could trigger a recourse to International Centre for the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSIO) arbitration or conciliation or additional facilities and 
might also be covered by arrangements under Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA). 
(d) The expansion of the geographical scope of the law is clearly relevant in terms 
of the nature and extent of the liability regimes. Several special regimes of 
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international liability have been created by Treaties, and, as such, are necessarily 
limited in its scope of application to parties to the Treaties. Some Treaties and 
Conventions are regional and therefore not applicable generally unless by special 
agreement of the regional or founding members. 
(e) Certainly the existing conflicts of interest relating to sovereignty, culture or 
economic development in terms of issues will to a larger or smaller extent affect the 
prospect of a negotiated liability regimes as well as the likelihood of their future 
success or failure. 
3. THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
(a) State responsibility is based on the existence of an internationally wrongful act 
attributable to the State. Such an act could be an action or omission. A State is 
responsible because it has committed an internationally wrongful act, whether by 
positive action or by sheer omission. An internationally wrongful act is committed 
when the State breaches an international obligation, by failing to perform what is 
required of it under international law. This is not to say that it is fault-based or non-
strict. The questions of fault or culpa or intention or state of mind are to be found in 
the various primary rules creating international obligation for States. "Due diligence" 
to my mind is more American parlance than an international term of art. Assuredly, 
the test of State responsibility depends on the requirement mandated by the particular 
primary rule of international law, a breach of which will entail the responsibility of the 
State in breach. It is not infrequent that subjective as well as objective criteria have 
been used. 
(b) Internationally agreed standards, if any - and there should be an increasing 
collection of such standards, will reduce the ambit of discretionality and subjectivity. 
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(c) The concepts of extra- or ultra-hazardous operations and risk are influencing the 
making of primary rules and the formulation of primary obligations incumbent upoFl 
States. A breach of any of the newly evolved obligations inevitably entails State 
responsibility as envisaged in the Draft Articles, Part I, on State Responsibility 
provisionally adopted on first reading by the International law Commission. 
(d) Yes, the concept of an international crime in connection with environmental 
obligations is a useful instrument for a more effective system of State responsibility. 
The question that remains controversial is the extent and practicability of punishing 
the State, or head of State or the minister responsible, or the official or private person 
committing the international crime against the environment. For instance, should we 
prosecute the head of State or head of government or the national army responsible 
for the grave environmental damage maliciously caused in Kuwait? 
(e) Liability as a primary rule for environmental damage cannot be fault-based. 
There must be injuria for every "damnum". There can be no cases of "damnum sine 
injuria". Under liability rule "ubi damnum ibi injuria", wherever that is harm, there is 
actionable liability. On the other hand, the law of State Responsibility in its definition 
and general principles does not require any injury or damage, it is injuria sine damno 
or responsibility regardless of injury of absence thereof. 
(f) Concurrent obligations are cumulative and will increase the likelihood of State 
responsibility for non-compliance. 
(g) Yes, the system of State responsibility and all national and international 
systems of civil liability should operate concurrently, in a complementary manner, to 
assist the victims or injured States and not to promote forum shopping or enhance the 
opportunities of vexatious litigations or malicious prosecutions. The last two deserve 
punitive sanctions from the international community. 
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(h) Positively, States cannot pretend to be innocent by-standers, reaping only the 
benefits and sharing no burdens when it is within their control and jurisdiction to 
permit, refuse, allow or tolerate certain activities which could result in harmful effects 
for other nations. 
4. STRICT LIABILITY AND NEW INTER-LINKAGES 
(a) Apparently the liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not 
prohibited by international law is stricter under international as well as national laws. 
It has to be strict since it is regardless of wrongfulness and independently of legal 
prohibition. This is an evolution on its own, and not related to any alleged fault-based 
liability or its contrast to liability without fault (responsabilite sans faute). 
(b) Such generalization appears dangerous and not very helpful to any problem-
solving attempt. 
(c) There is primary obligation incumbent on the part of every State to see to it 
that no harm occurs outside its territory as the result of activities inside its territory 
or within its control. The State is held accountable by international law to answer for 
the injurious consequences. Once the State fails to comply with this obligation, it 
becomes responsible and all the legal consequences of State responsibility flow from 
its international liability. 
On the other hand, this does not release actual operators from primary civil 
liability both for the harms caused to outsiders and for the wrongful acts committed 
whether or not through negligence, criminal negligence, or without due diligence. 
There is a dual regime of liabilities, nationally and internationally. The operators are 
directly and primarily liable under the national laws of the country in which they 
operate, while that State is primarily liable under international law to the injured State 
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for the harmful consequences suffered by the victims across the boundary line. 
Under the national legal system, the operators could find no comfort nor relief from 
the absence of legal provisions proscribing the operations. Whether or not this 
liability is strict, absolute, without fault, etc., under the national law of the host State, 
the State could accept international liability or be condemned to pay compensation 
internationally, and obtain reimbursement from the operators under its own law, by 
subrogating the rights of the injured parties. 
(d) The apportionment of liability is not feasible between international and national 
legal systems. Rather the question of priorities must by settled as between the State 
responsible for allowing harmful consequences to generate from its territory or under 
its control and the actual operators answerable for the harms caused with or without 
fault. Allocation of priorities is not essentially or too remotely different from 
apportionment of burden or duty to compensate. Priorities also relate to the primary 
and subsidiary character of liability, depending on the legal system under which 
compensation is sought. Thus, the State has primary liability if proceeded against by 
another State, while under its own legal system the operators have uncontested 
primary responsibility or civil liability regardless of any residual responsibility of the 
territorial State. 
(f) Dual liability should be concurrent, or joint and several, rather than subsidiary. 
It is not always convenient to regard the international adjudication as the primary 
system. There is indeed the possibility of exhaustion if not the requirement of primary 
recourse to local machinery for dispute resolution. 
(g) The State back-up or primary system of liability, depending on the stand-point 
of the injured parties, should operate in conjunction with, rather than in isolation from, 
other concurrent mechanisms such as insurance and international funds. 
(i) There is an enigma in the phrase "multinational operators" which may beg the 
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question. Are we concerned with the problem of the nationality of claims or that of 
the corporation whose stocks or shares have been internationally floated? Is it a 
question of locus standi of a nation-State or rather a question of selection of the 
respondent State against which proceedings should be instituted? Whatever the 
ultimate answers to these questions, the fact remains that the two-track approach 
should be also complemented by a two way system for each track. International law 
cannot allow a State or multiple States controlling a multi-national corporation to 
extend diplomatic protection for their economic interests without attaching to this 
right of protection the duty of accountability or answerability for the unsavory 
activities or questionable intents of these multi-national corporations lurking in 
developing countries, looking for new pastures for profitable exploitation regardless 
of the primary interests of the host countries. States whose nationals are answerable 
for the activities and projects of multi-national corporations should be held liable for 
the harmful consequences flowing from their wilful misconduct. Failure to meet the 
international standard of care to prevent harm caused by their nationals, natural and 
juridical, including multi-nationals, should lead to a breach of duty to prevent harm, 
and consequently, engaging the responsibility of the States of which multi-national 
corporations are nationals. Of course, here an order of predominance of control 
should dictate the order of priorities for their right to protect as well as their duty to 
compensate for the misadventures of multi-nationals. 
5. STRICT LIABILITY AND THE NEED FOR LEGAL CERTAINTY 
LIMITS, INSURANCE AND COLLECTIVE REPARATION 
(a) Any open-ended system of liability, strict for fault-based, is to be avoided. 
Stricter liability should be limited in the upper ceiling of compensation, otherwise no 
investor would dare to undertake the risk. This is not unnatural as we have seen in 
the context of the Warsaw Convention of 1929 in international air transport. On the 
other hand, liability for harm caused by industrial activities across the frontier cannot 
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be limited except to the extent of the injury suffered. Thus, compensation or redress 
to be accorded should be tantamount to the injury suffered without limitation·, 
whereas remoteness of consequences should be tested by a more acceptable theory 
of causation, whether it be causa causans, causa sine quanon, direct causes, 
combination of independent causes or approximate causes, thereby foreclosing the 
open-endedness of liability severing from it all remote consequences. 
(b) Full compensation should remain the ideal criterion, while limitation is placed 
at that point. There should be no more than full compensation in the sense of 
unlimited, excessive, exemplary, punitive or exorbitant damages without regard for the 
actual injury suffered or the damaging consequences incurred. Beyond full 
compensation lie preventive or precautionary measures. 
(c) It is pertinent to consider full or unlimited liability schemes, commensurate with 
the injury suffered, taking into account the need for appropriate or apportioned 
contributions from operators, insurance companies, liable States and the available 
special funds, each with its own ceiling or limitation which together provide an 
aggregate whole covering the fullest (unlimited) compensation without imposing 
penalty on any of the parties accountable for the contribution. 
(d) Yes, an unlimited overall liability scheme in the sense discussed would be an 
answer to any allegation of unfairness. 
(e) Yes, but appropriateness depends on the particular circumstances of each type 
of damage. 
(f) That may depend on the amount of the premium set or the insurance policy 
chosen by the insured. 
(g) "Unlimited liability" is a very ambiguous term, and can only be used in the 
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limited context in which the subject-matter is circumscribed. For instance, a company 
which is not a limited company is still limited in its liability by the existence and 
availability of the assets that can be marshalled to pay for all the debts in case of 
bankruptcy or dissolution. The unlikelihood of uninsurability is something only an 
insurance company could answer. 
(h) A system of mandatory insurance is preferred in many instances, such as 
compulsory insurance for diplomatic motor-vehicles. 
(i) Requirement by the State is consistent with the precautionary principle. 
Insurance can best fulfil its role in such operations which may entail harmful 
consequences. 
(j) Reconciliation may well depend on the terms and conditions of the insurance 
policy. There may be several levels of intention. For instance, there is a clear 
intention to drive a motor-vehicle, but no intention to skid, or to hit a pedestrian in any 
given case of a road accident. 
(k) An appropriate and ideal solution need to be found which must be just as well 
as equitable for all concerned. 
(I) There should be a mechanism for collective compensation where the source of 
harm cannot be clearly determined. Even if the source is determinable, such as oil 
pollution from a sea-going vessel, a collective mechanism like the common fund would 
be helpful. 
(m) Adequacy of such funds depend on the imagination of contributors and the 
seriousness and frequency of the occurrences of disasters, such as earthquakes. In 
which could trigger a chain of events. In any event, inadequate funds could be 
replenished. 
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(n) Yes, to an appreciable extent. 
(o) Yes, they contribute noticeably to this preventive role. 
(p) Each of the new principles mentioned, the precautionary principle, the polluter 
pays principle, and the principle of common but differentiated responsibility has its 
impact on liability regimes with varying degrees of legal consequences. 
(q) International assistance to avoid environmental damage is desirable, but it is far 
from being adequate substitute to liability regimes, and it will take time before a 
meaningful mechanism of international assistance can be put in place. For instance, 
the Malacca Straits States have devised the traffic separation scheme which 
constitutes but an initial minimum measure to prevent oil pollution caused by incident 
of navigation at sea. 
6. NEW ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH LIABILITY AND RESPONSE ACTION 
(a) Yes, primary responsibility of response actions should be placed on the 
operators, several duties are incumbent upon them, such as the duty to give warning, 
notification and immediate response actions including restoration and cleaning-up 
measures. 
(b) Yes, it would entail additional liability because it constitutes a separate breach 
of a secondary obligation, following from the breach of the primary rule or obligation. 
(c) Compliance with the secondary obligation is normally designed to ensure 
stoppage, abatement or mitigation of injurious consequences. It neither reduces nor 
eliminates the liability for the accomplished breach of the primary obligation. 
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However, if compliance with secondary obligations does prevent the occurrence of 
harmful effects, then no liability is created because no actual damage was caused. 
State responsibility is not engaged in this instance as the incidence of harm has been 
obviated. There is no victim, no injured party, hence no liability. 
(d) Ideally, it should be the duty of any able-bodied entity to assist in the response 
action, as in other cases of national calamity, such as major earthquakes, forest fires, 
etc. 
(e) Yes, contingency plans, etc, constitute the necessary tools for initial minimal 
discharge of response action obligations. They may or may not be adequate for the 
situation, depending on the swiftness with which response actions are taken, see, for 
instance, response actions by Japan to the 1995 Kobe earthquake. 
(f) Failure to prepare a contingency plan engages the primary responsibility of the 
State and also its liability which is not subsidiary, nor indeed secondary. Failure to 
comply with its contingency plan is an additional liability for breach of secondary 
obligation by the State. 
(g) Response actions may entail some expenses. The cost of such actions should 
be borne by those responsible to undertake them. However, the State should feel free 
if not obligated to reimburse private organizations which have volunteered their 
services in the response actions. 
(h) It is part of the chain of consequences. The cost of response actions could be 
claimed as part of the compensation for damage, although it could be itemized as a 
separate item forming part of the integral amount of the total compensation to be 
awarded. 
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7. DEFINING ACTIVITIES WHICH MAY ENGAGE STRICT LIABILITY 
(a) In every special liability regime, it is necessary at the outset to define, specify 
and identify activities or the type of activities deemed to be environmentally 
dangerous. 
(b) Certainly, the nature of the risk involved and the financial implications of such 
identification should be taken into consideration. 
(c) The current trends in State practice appears to indicate a more sophisticated 
differentiation of the varying degrees of dangerous activities, classifying them into at 
least three categories, ultra hazardous, hazardous and dangerous, depending on the 
likelihood of the harm generated and the seriousness or gravity of such harm. 
(d) No, activities in a geographical area, even the most sensitive, cannot be 
presumed in advance as dangerous, only activities likely to cause harm or potentially 
harm-generating activities could be categorized as dangerous, hazardous or ultra 
hazardous, according to the nature of the resulting harm. 
(e) The order of priority could be arranged in accordance with the criteria of 
seriousness or gravity of the danger involved or the risk incurred. 
(f) A liability regime may take into account the multiple criteria for such priority to 
determine a priori the degree of strictness of the liability commensurate with the risk 
entailed by the regime. 
8. IDENTIFYING DAMAGE IN THE CONTEXT OF LIABILITY REGIMES 
(a) Damage to the environment as such could be assessed for the purpose of 
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calculating compensation over and above and independently of the amount of 
compensation already paid or to be paid in respect of death, personal injury and loss 
of property, resulting from the damage to the environment. 
(b) Yes, a special regime in the context of liability for environmental damage 
should be comprehensive enough to cover incidental injuries to persons as well as 
property, irrespective of the existing rules of international or domestic law. However, 
compensation already paid in regard to loss of property and personal injuries should 
be taken into account in assessing the total amount of compensation, without 
incurring double jeopardy for the offending State or double payment of compensation 
for the same victims or injured parties. 
(c) The problem is where to draw the line between other types of damage arising 
directly from such environmental damage. How far is consequential damage to be 
taken into consideration under the umbrella of this comprehensive regime? These 
questions may be answered in the same sense as the theory of causation adopted. 
(d) Some types of damage, such as mental anguish or suffering appear to deserve 
a separate study and not forming part of the "all types" of damage, including physical 
injury sustained by persons, as the result of environmental damage. 
(e) A special regime should provide for the normal types of damage associated 
with, or flowing directly from, the environmental damage concerned. Another 
limitation is necessarily placed on the extent or degree of damage which should be 
appreciable and not negligible. Here the rule "de minimis non curat lex" should apply. 
9. ISSUES RELATED TO THE DEGREE OF DAMAGE 
{a) There should be a floor above which all damage should be covered by the 
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liability regime. Without "de minimis" rule, there will be endless litigations, vexatious 
suits, malicious prosecutions and other abuses of legal proceedings. 
(b) The distinctions listed appear to provide an appropriate approach to the 
establishment of the minimum or appreciable damage which is beyond toleration, 
entailing serious impact, or major or more permanent impact. 
(c) Foreseeability relates to reasonable foresight which could be more subjective 
than an objective standard. Besides, we are concentrating on "injury" or "injurious 
consequence" without fault or irrespective of intention. However, absence of any 
foreseeability could imply remoteness of consequence or lack of connection, thereby 
severing the chain of causation. 
(d) Foreseeability of damage, such as from earthquakes, is a relative vision prior 
to actual occurrence and should in no circumstance preclude the insurance coverage. 
On the other hand, non-foreseeability may provide an excuse for non-coverage or 
incomplete coverage of a particular insurance policy. 
(e) Yes, it would appear to facilitate the distinction and further clarify reasonable 
foresight. 
(f) That depends on the definition of "minor" damage. Minimal or infinitesimal 
damage should be covered by "de minimus" rule. On the other hand, accumulation 
for a lengthy duration of repeated "minor" damage on a continuing basis may exceed 
the level of tolerability of injury suffered. 
(g) The purpose of the exercise to place all impacts above the degree of "minor" 
to be defined with greater precision, at the level of actionable injury. 
(h) That appears to be the logical consequence of the definition or distinction to be 
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drawn between above the line of "minor" damage and below the line which is 
tolerable and as such sustainable. 
(i) Assessment will entail no additional burden and should be made in any case. 
What it would lead to is a different proposition. 
(j) As earlier indicated, the fact that an impact is foreseen should neither create 
nor eliminate liability for the resulting damage. Foreseen consequence is direct 
consequence, covered by any theory of causation. Failure to prevent foreseen 
consequence engages the liability of those responsible for the operation. 
(k) On the contrary, the liability regime should cover foreseen, unforeseen, 
accidental as well as incidental damage arising out of the activity in question. 
Foreseeability entails additional burden of precautionary measures to be taken to 
prevent or abate the harmful consequences. Once occurred, harmful effects would 
give rise to liability in any event. 
(I) No, we should therefore make sure, that none of the propositions made is 
designed to deviate or derogate from the duty to prevent and abate harmful effects 
whatever the mechanism created. 
(m) Leaving out the term "due diligence" which is imprecise and devoid of 
internationally accepted meaning, State responsibility is clearly engaged when the 
State fails to fulfil any of its international obligations. It is for us now to formulate 
such a primary rule which generates an international obligation incumbent upon States 
to undertake environmental impact assessment in every field of activities. 
• 
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10. LIABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES 
(a) Definitely and positively yes. 
(b) State responsibility is engaged whenever there is a breach of an international 
obligation arising out of a treaty regardless of damage; but when this results in any 
adverse impact another international obligation is breached regardless of the treaty 
obligation either because of its own doing (action) or because of its failure to maintain 
effective control over its private enterprises (omission). 
(c) The State is responsible for failure to devise rules and standards to prevent 
environmental damage in the first place. Whether or not the operators is also or 
secondarily also liable may depend on its knowledge or foreseeability. The strictness 
of liability imposed on such an operator will depend on the local, federal or national 
legislation. The State concerned may have been lenient in its rules, standards and 
governmental controls, but may nonetheless hold the actual author of the 
environmental damage absolutely liable under its own law of tort for absolute or strict 
liability for hazardous or ultra hazardous activity in spite of conformance with its 
internal regulation. 
(d) That depends on what constitute "wrongful" enforcement measures. Do they 
include incompetent or inefficient enforcement measures or corruptible measures? 
(e) There should be no need to prove significant impact or injury as the 
classification of substances as highly dangerous is sufficient evidence of the 
seriousness or significance of the impact or injury. However, the assessment of 
compensation, after establishing liability and State responsibility, is still required in the 
determination of the amount of compensation to be paid by the wrongdoer and other 
preventive measures to be undertaken by the operator. 
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(f) At the current stage of technological development, and in the absence of a 
more plausible criterion, yes, the presumption of causality is useful. 
(g) No, we must search for a better formulation of a rule than the shifting of the 
burden of proof. 
11 . THE DEBATE ABOUT EXEMPTIONS FROM LIABILITY 
(a) There should be no exemption from liability, except when the State discharges 
its duty to pay appropriate compensation or when the injured State consents to or 
acquiesces in the damage or injury suffered. 
(b) The instances mentioned should provide no ground for exemption from the 
liability to pay compensation or to undertake further preventive measures to prevent 
recurrence of the damage or harmful consequences. 
(c) They are no exemptions. The most that can be said is only by way of 
mitigation or alleviation of liability which is shared by acts or omissions of a third 
party. 
(d) To some extent it is admissible, not in complete exoneration of its direct 
liability, but in abatement or mitigation of the gravity of the consequences of the 
action taken by the operator. 
(e) Yes, the State is responsible once the act is attributable to the State, but 
without releasing the actual operator of its primary responsibility. Both should share 
the liability to the extent of their respective contribution to the resulting harms. The 
public authority concerned becomes accountable under the administrative law of the 
territorial State. 
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(f) The fault of the victims in some legal system may be regarded as exempting or 
exonerating the tortfeasor from liability, as in "contributory negligence" at one time 
in force in a common law country. If however the activity was not undertaken at the 
instigation of the injured party, there is no exemption. 
(g) Yes, in that case compensation may be withheld or reduced pro rata the 
contribution to its cause by the injured party. 
(h) Yes, for the victim only if at all. 
(i) No, that is a crime under international law, entailing punishment as well as 
liability to pay compensation. 
(j) The later obligation subsist in any event. However, the response action may 
serve to reduce the gravity of the injury suffered, hence the amount of compensation 
to be paid. 
(k) No, but humanitarian activities have other rewards. 
(I) Exemptions should only be admitted very sparingly, otherwise they would erode 
special liability regimes. 
(m) Yes, there must be clear and convincing evidence of a direct causal link. 
(n) No, it should not constitute an exemption. 
(o) There should be sufficient incentives for States to become parties to a given 
liability regime. Any pretext or resort to the use of flags of environmental 
convenience should be discouraged. 
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(p) That incentive would be a sound start on the road to the establishment of a 
workable mechanism. 
(q) Yes, there should be no objection to the extra-territorial application of the 
stricter laws of an advanced country such as the United States to all U.S. enterprises 
regardless of the geographical areas of their operation. This does not mean that U.S. 
laws should apply to non-U.S. operators outside U.S. territory, jurisdiction or control. 
(r) The differences between strict and absolute liability are very relative. Even the 
most absolute of liability is relative. 
(s) No, partly because absence of willfulness is a negative subjective evidence not 
readily susceptible of concrete or objective proof. 
12. A BROADER FRAMEWORK FOR THE REPARATION OF DAMAGE 
(a) Certainly is should be so broadened as to include not only measures ex nunc 
(immediate cessation of damaging activity) but at least also measures ex tunc 
((inclusive of restoration, clean up and payment for economic loss, such as damnum 
emergens and lucrum cessans. 
(b) It is a fair beginning. We should start with rehabilitation although it may take 
time and expenses, barring disproportionate spending. 
(c) It would provide a fair substitute performance of that secondary obligation 
flowing from the breach of the primary rule resulting in environmental damage. 
(d) Equitable assessment of compensation is an alternative approach, no better, nor 
worse, but it may or may not be appropriate for each particular incident. 
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(e) Contingency plans should provide necessary criteria, but no plans can cover all 
contingencies. 
(f) Demarcation of baseline condition will be useful for restoration criteria. 
(g) Where restoration or restitutio in integrum is not feasible, impairment of use, 
aesthetic or wilderness values would provide a reasonable standard of compensation 
for a start. 
(h) International guidelines are often based on the practice of States which 
originates internally. 
(i) Diplomatic means do not necessarily constitute an alternative to adequate 
compensation. 
(j) For irreparable damage, nothing would provide satisfactory relief for the victim. 
However, a combination of measures of relief or redress might help ease the pain and 
suffering of the injured parties. No stone should be left unturned. 
(k) It often happened in actual practice. Yet there should be substitute 
performance which at least is designed to establish or restore pre-existing or 
equivalent conditions. 
(I) No, we should not allow that situation to arise. 
(m) Punitive compensation by way of pecuniary damages may serve dual purpose. 
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13. EXPANDING THE ACCESS TO EFFECTIVE REMEDIES 
(a) The traditional rules of international law regarding direct or special interest may 
have to evolve in a more flexible way to allow an extension of a "jus standi" for a 
State or a close relative of an injured individual to obtain relief. If environmental 
damage is against the whole world or the international community, there should be 
grounds for a State or an individual to establish sufficient special interest to seek relief 
by demanding cessation of such damaging activity. 
(b) It should be feasible to identify a sufficiently precise legal interest in 
environmental matters. However, the environment per se has a global implication 
with possibility of successive chain reactions beyond immediate calculation. 
(c) Whatever rules already adopted in State practice at national or international 
level would be pertinent to broadening the standing of claimants. What is more 
important is the purpose of ending injurious consequences of an activity at source. 
(d) In the absence of a direct legal interest, the public at large, or community, or 
society, or society or the State should be the claimant as in most criminal prosecution 
with the view to arresting or abating the harmful consequences of a criminal activity. 
(e) The concept of "trustees" is abandoned in most civil-law systems, although 
the term "trusteeship" has been revived in the context of the United Nations. 
Whatever our final resolution, it should be observed that the environment is a common 
heritage of mankind. It is for everyone, every State to protect and preserve. Any 
one, any State could act on behalf of the international community when it is a matter 
of general global concern. 
(f) Yes, the United Nations or its principal organs, such as the Security Council 
and the General Assembly, each in its own sphere, could act on behalf of the global 
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community. 
(g) It could serve as a consolidation of class actions and the compensation obtained 
could be spread to all injured parties while restoration measures and response actions 
would benefit the collectivity of nations and peoples as a whole. 
(h) Yes, their role deserves closer attention. 
(i) Yes, although we already witnessed the establishment of an "environmental 
chamber" within the International Court of Justice, and the L.O.S. Tribunal for the 
marine environment. 
(j) This is a different proposition. The Barcelona Traction is an outmoded remnant 
of stricter rule regarding nationality of claims in the treatment of aliens, long overtaken 
by modern developments in particular regard to international environmental law. 
Barcelona Traction decision is neither precedent, nor relevant for international claims 
for environmental damage. The Kuwait environmental claims before the Geneva 
claims commission provide ample proof of a clear departure from the limited 
application of the ius standi for "multinational corporation" to be represented by the 
State of incorporation or the State of which the corporation is national. 
(k) The deciding authority, whether a Chamber or a Tribunal, should have the 
power to join all claims in a class or joint action to save time and expenses of 
duplication. 
14. SECURING ACCESS TO REMEDIES BY THE INDIVIDUAL 
(a) No, but there is ample room for improvement. 
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(b) It is already established and it should be encouraged to exercise jurisdiction 
wherever practical. 
(c) This is done in several instances, such as in the Mekong Committee, at any rate 
for the planning and development of the Lower Mekong Basin for at least four 
decades. 
(d) Yes, it is an absolute must, if we are ever to succeed in our conservation 
efforts for the common good of the environment. 
(e) First, there should be a clear set of rules for the apportionment of liability 
among States, author States as well as victim or injured States. A mechanism may 
exist in various forms of international dispute settlement. 
(f) It will do for a start, although further improvement in the process should be 
welcome. 
(g) Yes, but it should not give rise to abuses which would defeat the object and 
purpose of the mechanism. We should learn from the experience of the Inter-
American Court a century ago. 
(h) No, it is neither adequate nor always useful. Some Courts assume jurisdiction 
without any sound legal basis. See, for instance, the Filartiga Case, which was not 
a criminal case. To say that torture is a universal crime, hence the exercise of criminal 
jurisdiction based on universality principle, is no excuse for the Court to arrogate to 
itself jurisdiction to adjudicate a tort claim without any connection with the "locus 
delicti commissi". 
(i) Yes, but domestic Courts have a tendency to act as "judex in sua causa", and 
to chide judicial responsibility on a convenient ground of "forum non conveniens" as 
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in the Bhopal Incident. 
(j) No, even the Courts in the same legal systems are not, as a rule, consistent, 
either within the same system acting as "judex in sua causa " or with other systems 
but still acting as "judex in sua causa". See, for instance, the decision of the United 
States Court and of the Korean Court in the aerial incident case involving KAL 007. 
(k) Reciprocity is required in some jurisdictions as a condition precedent for 
allowing recovery. Reciprocity is a necessary evil in international judicial relations and 
provide a lame excuse for a domestic Court to allow or disallow recovery, based on 
the existence or absence of proof of actual reciprocity. By itself, reciprocity is 
questionable as a solution which presupposes the pre-existing precedent set up by the 
other jurisdiction. 
(I) No, they are dictated by considerations that are not free from national 
prejudices and often tainted with political and non legal considerations. 
(m) Yes, on the whole, Courts are impartial, but in several countries of dubious 
requirement of "due process", impartiality may be an exception rather than the 
prevailing rule. 
(n) As long as local remedies are available, they should be resorted to. Their 
exhaustion is not required in every case, exceptions have enlarged, and States have 
dispensed with the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies rule, as in the 
Washington Convention of 1 965. 
(o) The requirement subsists in the case of injury to aliens as reflected to Article 
22 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, precisely to show that the State still 
has another opportunity to be in compliance with an international obligation if by 
providing local remedies, its obligation is prevented from being breached. 
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(p) Of course, it is practical to separate State responsibility from civil liability. For 
one thing, the two concepts operate in different dimensions and at different levels. 
On the same international level, liability of a State is a primary rule relating to harmful 
effect, whereas responsibility is comparable to the law of obligations, torts, contracts 
and crimes combined. 
(q) In environmental matters, State immunity in its limited application subsists in 
regard to activities of the State performed in the exercise of a governmental authority. 
When the activities are not in the exercise of governmental authority, immunity is 
absent if the dispute is one falling within the categories of disputes which by the rules 
of private international law, the Court in question is a competent court with proper 
jurisdiction to decide the case in accordance with the applicable law. 
(r) That appears to be a general rule. Here national treatment is generally admitted 
in the bilateral treaties, such as F.C.N. Treaties, between States on an equal footing, 
barring unequal Treaties. 
(s) Dispute prevention in the sense of settlement a /'amiable through other 
alternative means of conflict resolution should be encouraged. 
15. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS 
(a) Thee are no preferred criteria for personal jurisdiction in cases involving multiple 
jurisdiction or conflict of laws and concurrence of jurisdiction. 
(b) Whenever there is a dispute of multinational character, there are questions of 
choice of law and choice of forum. In some cases, States have agreed before hand 
to have the matter decided by an international Tribunal or to have the international 
29 
Court determine which national Court should exercise jurisdiction. Compare the 
Treaty of Lausanne in the Lotus Case. 
(c) Yes, many international regimes provide for dispute resolution at the option of 
the parties. 
(d) Yes, such regimes often provide rules for the choice of law. 
(e) Enforcement is better ensured if the decision is by a national Court. But when 
it is an indication of provisional measures or final judgement on the merits by an 
international Tribunal, execution or enforcement measures are often lacking, save in 
exceptional cases like the Iran/United States Claims Tribunal 
{f) In principle, yes; but in practice legal aid is still in its infancy before the 
International Court of Justice. Financial resources are few and far short of what is 
needed to afford the costs of transnational litigation. 
(g) Yes, there are reasons to hope that eventually and inevitably uniform principles 
regarding jurisdiction and the applied environmental law be developed to enhance 
further international judicial cooperation. 
(h) Yes, there is a rudimentary response in the narrow scope of the 1968 Brussels 
Convention and the 1988 Lugano Convention, but much more need to be achieved 
on the global basis, beyond regional European confines. 
(i} Yes, and U.N.E.P. as well as other competent specialized agencies of the United 
Nations should have a role to play. Ultimately the Security Council is the guardian of 
peaceful and healthful use of the environment. Exchange of information is inherent 
in the duty of States to cooperate, while on-site inspection should be permitted 
wherever feasible. 
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16. ADVANCING INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 
(a) Yes, but how comprehensive and how many such regimes? The next question 
is one of priority for the negotiation and conclusion of Treaties creating such special 
regimes. 
(b) It might assist the development of uniform application of rules of substance and 
procedure by national Courts. 
{c) They should play an active role. Nothing to prevent their submission of a Pro 
bono or Amicus brief in any international or transnational litigation. Private 
associations and foundations should have a limited standing, not as parties to the 
dispute but at any rate as observers or interested friends of the Court. 
(d) Enormously yes; national legislatures often seek guidance from existing 
international instruments and can be inspired by the successes of relevant regimes 
created by Treaties. 
(e) At this stage of legal development, we should aim at the creation of as many 
specific regimes as feasible and ultimately they could be combined or merged into a 
single composite regime encompassing all aspects of environmental matters. A 
comprehensive international regime is an ideal to be targeted with the realization that 
it will only be achieved in the remote future. 
(f) Yes, effective liability principles require different treatments with varying 
degrees and levels of stringency, limits, exceptions and other characteristics relating 
to the specific nature of the activities. 
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(g) Yes, and that appears to be the current trends in the practice of States. See, 
for instance, the joint efforts and collective endeavors of the ASEAN States in regard 
to the management of environmental affairs. 
(h) Yes, it is plausible and likely for States and entities to apply principles and 
solution albeit mutalis mutandis to different types of special regimes, once the issues 
and questions relating to them have been clearly identified. 
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